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AN IOWA FUGITIVE SLAVE CASE.
In the Supreme Court, .Inly, ]S30.
IN THE MATTER OF RALPH (A COLORED MAN,)-ON
HABEAS CORPUS.
Where A., formerly a slave, goes with tho consent of bis master, to
bocomo a permanent resident of a free State, ho cannot be regarded
as a fugitive slave.
The act of isao, for the admission of Jfissonri into the Union, which
prohibits slavery north of .T(i deg. 30 min. was not intended merely
as a naked declaration, requiring legislative action in the States
to carry it into elîect, but must bo rogardod as an oiitire and linai
prohibition.
The master, who subsequently to tliis'act, permits his slave to become
a resident here, cannot afterwards oxerciso any acts of ownership
over him within this territory. •
Ralph, being within this territory, was claimed by
Montgomery, a resident of the State of Missouri, as his
slave, and by virtue of a precept from a Justice of the
Peace, under the Act of the Legislative Assembly of
Iowa, (satisfactory proof, under the Act, having been
made, to such Justice, that Ralph was the property of the
claimant), the sheriff of Dubuque county delivered the
negro "into the custody and possession of the claimant,
who took him on board a steamboat, bound for Missouri,
and delivered him to the master of the boat, to transport
him to Missouri, who confined him in the vessel.
A Habeas Corpus having been granted, upon the pe-
tition of A. Buttervvorth, Ralph was brought before the
District Judge of the third district, whence, by the con-
sent of the parties the proceedings were removed to this
Court.
It was admitted, upon the hearing of the cause, that
Ralph came to Dubuque, now within this territory, with
the consent of his master, in the year 1834, and that, at
that time, he was the slave of the claimant; that the
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claimant, at that time, entered into an agreement, in writ-
ing, with Ralph, to the effect that, upon the- i^ayment by
, the slave oi the sum oí |500, togetlier with .?50 in addition
ior his hire, with interest irom January 1st, 1833, he was
to become iree; and it was to earn the purchase money ior
his ireedom that he leit Missouri," and came to Dubuque,
when he commeuced working iu the lead mines aud so re-
maiued working in the lead mines ' uutil the time oi the
proceedings beiore the justice. Then Ralph, having
iailed to comply with his contract, he was reclaimed by
his forjner master. • •
Rorer, for the petitioner, contended
First. That Ralph, being a resident oí the Territory
oí Wisconsin, at the time both oí the passage and taking
effect oí the Orgauic Law oí the iTerritory—and also a
resident oí Iowa Territory, at the time oí the passage and
taking effect oí the Organic Law 'oi Iowa Territory, he
became iree by operation oí the 12th sectiou oí said Or-
ganic Laws, which expressly extend to the inhabitants oí
said Terx'itories oí Iowa and Wisconsiu, tiie beueilts oí the
Articles oí Compact contained in the Ordinance ior the
Goverument oi the Territory north-west oi the rivei- Ohio,
by which the benefit oí the writ oí Habeas Corpus (the
remedy here sought) is guaranteed to the inhabitants oí
said Territories north-west pi Ohio—and which also de-
clares, "No man shall be deprived oí his liberty, or prop-
erty, but bj'^  the judgmeut oí his peers, or the law oi the
land."—{äd Article of Compact, contained in the Ordinance
of Congress of 17S7.) Aud that, "There shall be neither
slavery, nor involuntary servitude, in the said Territory
—otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereoi the
parties shall have been duly convicted."—{See 6th Article
of said Compact.) '
Second. That, independent oi : the Articles oi Com-
pact and Orgauic Laws above cited, Raiph became iree so
soon as, by consent oí his master, he became an inhabitant
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of wiiat is now the Territory of Iowa, by virtue of the Act
of Congress, entitled—"An Act to autiiorize the people of
Missouri Territory to form a Constitution and State Gov-
ernment, and for the admission of sucii State into the
Union, on an equal footing with the original States, and
to proiiibit slavery in certain Territories:"—By which It
is declared, that "In ail that Territory ceded by France to
the Uiiited States, under tiie name of Louisiana, which lies
nortii of tliirty-six degrees and tiiirty minutes north lati-
tude, not included within the limits of tiie State con-
templated by this act, slavery and involuntary servitude,
otherwise tiian in the xiunisiiment of crimes, whereof tiie
parties siiall have been duly convicted, shall be, and is
iiereby, forever prohibited."—See Sth Section of said Act.
Ing. Digest of Laivs of United States of America-—61Jf.)—That
the present Territory, being part of tiie country subjected
to sucii prohibition, the petitioner, as there is no law by
whicii lie can be removed elsewhere, is free in the exer-
cise of his right to remain here. Where a West Indian
slave came to England with his master, and again returned
with him to the West Indies, it was iield, that, altiiough lie
was still subject to servitude on his return to the Indies,
yet "no coercion could be exei'cised over him while in
England."—{2d Hagg. Adm. Bep. 9Ji.—Sd Kent's Com. note to
page 2^9.) The claimant cannot possess any natural rigiit
to remove the petitioner to where he may, by the aid of
human law, be reduced again to slavery—for such a state
is declared to be "repugnant to reason and the principles
of Natural Law."—(Blac. Com., vol. 1, p. J,£S.)
And still stronger is the language of much earlier and
higher authority:—in the divine writings of Moses it is
said, "Thou shalt not deliver unto his maister tiie servant
which is escaped from his master unto thee."—{2Srd chap.
Deut. 15th verse.) But this is not a case of an "escape,"
but emigration by consent of the master.
Third. Tiiat he cannot be considered as either com-
ing into, or remaining in the Territory in violation of tiie
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law prohibiting persons of color from settling in this
Territory, without evidence of freedom, etc., for it is in
evidence that lie was here at the time of, and pi-evious to
the organization of tbe Territorial Government, and even
at the time of the first extension of civil government over
tbe country, by the act of Congress of 1834, attaching it
to the then Territory of Michigan for temporary gov-
ernment.
Fourth. Tbat he cannot be reclaimed and delivered
over to his former owner, under our statute, nor under
the laws, ordinance, or constitution of tbe United States,
providing for the re-taking of fugitive slaves who bave
escaped from service; for it is in evidence tbat be came
to, and remained in tbe Territoi-y, not as a fugitive from
service, to which be was then legally holden in some
State of the Union, but by tbe voluntary consent and
agreement of bis former owner, tbe present claimant.
Fifth. Tbat the claimant, Montgomery, by permitting
bis slave to come to tbat portion of the Territory of tbe
United States in whicii slavery was then, and still is, pro-
hibited, for the purpose of remaining indefinitely, virtually
manumitted sucb slave,—tbat the very fact of his contract-
ing with, presupposes a state of freedom on the part of tbe
slave,—tbat if Montgomery bas any relief, it is on tbat
contract, for the money agreed to be paid, wbicli is noitber
conceded here, nor deemed in any manner essential to the
adjudication of this question, which is a question entirely
of freedom. i
Lee versus Lee, 8 Peter's Rep. 44.—Fanny versus
Montgomery and Otliei's, Bréeseos Reps. 188.—Act of
Virginia for Cession of Northwest Territory, 5tb vol. Liaws
U. S. A. 473.—Jobn Merry versus Tiffin and Menard, 1 vol.
Misso. Rep. 725.—Winny versus Wbitesides, ib. 472.—
Ralj)b versus Duncan, 3d Misso. Rep. 194.—Julia versus
Samuel McKinney, ib. 270.—1st Blac. Com. 127, ib. 423,
424, 425.—2d of Kent's Com. 247, 248, 249.—Case of
AN IOWA FUGITIVE SLAAHC CASE. 535
Sommerset, 11 vol. State Trials, p. 339.—Lofts' Reps.
1.—Case of Knight, a Negro Slave, in 177S. — Kfune's
Principles of Equity, vol. 2d 134;
J. D. Learned, for Montgomery, contended
That "the act of 1820, for admitting Missouri into the
Union, which contained a prohibition of slavery, north of
latitude 36 deg. 30 min. except within the limits of Miss-
ouri, was not intended to have efïect oii the rights of in-
dividuals, without further legislative enactments, but that
it was intended merely to direct local legislatures in
passing laws to prohibit slavery withiu the prescribed
limits—that the Act of Congress contained no sanction,
and consequently, had no binding force."
BY THE COURT.
This case does not come before us in any of the
ordinary methods of application to an appellate Court, so
that it is, perhaps, not strictly regular for us to entertain
jurisdiction of it at all. As, however, it involves an im-
portant question, which may, ere long, if unsettled,
become an exciting one, and as it is by the mutual assent
and request of all the parties interested, we concluded to
listen to the argument, and make a decision in the case
without intending it as a precedent for the future practice
of this Court.
The i^etitioner, a colored man, who was claimed as a
slave before the Justice of the Peace, and who was about
to be delivered up accordingly, asserts that he is free. If
this be actually the case, the writ of Habeas Corpus was
properly brought, being the only means by which the
Judge of the District Court could exercise a remedial con-
trol over tbe illegal acts of a Justice of the Peace, in cases
like this. The proceedings having been tran.sferred to
this Court, it will be proper for us to make such a di.spo-
sition of the matter as niight have been made by the Dis-
trict Judge while the subject was before him.
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The claimant asks that the petitioner be restored to
him as a slave, and principally for the following reasons:
In the first place, that, by Act of Congress of 1820, whicli
authorized the people of Missouri to form a Constitution
and State Government, and which prohibited slavery in
all that portion of the old Louisiana Territory lying north
of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes of north latitude,
not including within the then contemplated State, it is
provided "That any person escaping into the Territory
thus set apart, from whom labor or service is lawfully
claimed, in auy State or Territory of the United States,
such fugitive may lawfully be reclaimed and conveyed to
the person claiming his said labor or services." Under
this provision, we are called upon to decide that the peti-
tioner is a fugitive slave, because, although the master
consented that he should come to this Territory, and for
aught that appears, remain here for four or five years,
still there was an ex^jress stipulation that he should, at
some future time, pay, to his former master, the sum of
five hundred dollars, with interest;—that, not having com-
plied with this agreement, he is to be regarded as being
here without permission, and, consequently, as having
escaped into the Territory. Such a construction would
introduce almost unqualified slavery into all the Free
States. The Constitution of the United States contains a
provision in relation to fugitive slaves substantially the
same as that embraced in the Act of Congress above l-e-
ferred to; so that, in this particular, all the Free States of
the Union are in the same predicament as this Territoi-y.
Suppose, then, the Southern master should permit his
slave to emigrate to some of the Free States, upon the
express condition that he should remain forever the slave,
or (which is the same thing) the submissive servant of
some particular individual, his heirs and assigns. While
he fulfills this agreement, he is a slave to his new master
in the North, and, as soon as he violates it, he becomes
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again the slave of the old one at the South, who may,
forthwith, reclaim him as a fugitive. We cannot counte-
nance such a doctrine.
From the iacts agreed upon in this case, it seems that
the claimant permitted his slave to come to this Territory.
The ijermission seems to have been absolute; but there
was also an understanding that the latter was to pay the
former a certain amount, as the price of his ' ireedom.
How the iailure to comply with this understanding could
render a removal, undertaken w i^th the master's consent,
an escape, we are unable to comprehend.. The petitioner
is under the same obligation to fulfill this engagement as
though, instead of its being the price of his freedom, the
debt had been incurred for the purchase of any other
species of property. It is a debt which he ought to pay,
but ior the non-payment of which no man in this Terri-
tory can be reduced to¡, slavery.
We do not say that there can be no escape where the
^lave g;oes to a Free State by the consent oi his Master.
Ii, sent upon an errand, or traveling in company of his
master, he should refuse to return, he might probably be
l'egarded as a fugitive. But this certainly cannot be the
case where the journey was undertaken Avith the under-
standing of all parties that the slave was going to become
a i^ermanent resident oi the Free State or Territory.
But it is contended, on the part of the claimant, that
slavery is not prohibited in this Tei-ritory—that the Act
of 1820, above-mentioned, is a mere naked declai-ation,
requiring further legislation to render it operative—tiiat
it merely imposes a duty on the States and Territories to
be formed within the prescribed limits, but that, without
iurther actiou on the subject, thelaw has no sanction, aud,
consequently, no force. This position, we think, cannot
be maintained. Congress possesses the supreme power of
legislation in relation to the Territories, and its right to
prohibit slavery—at least in relation to-slaves subsequent-
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ly introduced—is doubtless legitimate. Has that riglit
been exercised in relation to this Territory? The language
of the Act of 1820, in relation to the district of country in
which this Territory is embraced, is, that slavery therein
"shall be, and is HEREBY, for ^ver prohibited." • This
seems to us an entire and final prohibition, not looking to
future legislative action to render it eiïectual.
But it is said .that, although the act may prohibit
slavery, it does not declare a forfeiture of slave property,
and that tiie most which the law will authorize will be, to
require the, master to remove that property out of the
Territory. It is true the Act, thus mentioned, does not,
in express terms, declare a forfeiture of slave property,
but it does, in effect, declare that such property shall not
exist.
The master who, subsequently to that Act, permits
his slave to become a resident here, cannot, afterwards,
exercise any acts of ownership over him within tiiis Ter-
ritory. The law does not take awa,y his i^roperty. in ex-
press terms, but declares it no longer to be property at
all. Of course those legal remedies, which can only be
resorted to upon the presumption of a still subsisting
ownership in the master, become altogether annihilated.
A wide difference exists between the present case and
that supposed in the argument, of an act of the Legislature
pi'ohibiting private banking. In the latter case the prop-
erty invested in that traffic, in violation of the law, would
not, in general, become forfeited. But suppose that,
instead of prohibiting the investment of property in private
banks, the Act should declare that property, so invested,
should cease to be the subject of property at all, (and sup-
pose a physical capability in thef law to carry out that
declaration), could the former owner, after such invest-
ment, invoke the aid of the laws to restore him what had
once been his, but which was now, like the air, rendered
incapable of being appropriated by any one? Such is.
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precisely, the state of things in the case now before us.
Property, in the slave, cannot exist without tbe existence
of slavery : The prohibition of the latter annihilates the
former, and, this being destroyed, he becomes free.
Could tbe claimant, in tbis case, retain tbe custody
and control of the petitioner, witbout invoking tbe aid of
our laws, and witbout their violation, we certainly sbould
not interfere to prevent him. But when he applies to our
tribunals for tbe purpose of controlling, as property, that
wbicb our laws bave declared shall not be property, it is
incumbent on them to refuse their co-operation. When in
seeking to accomplish bis object, be illegally restrains a
human being of bis liberty, it is proper tbat tbe laws,
wbicb sbould extend equal protection to men of all colors
and conditions, should exert their remedial interposition.
We tbink, therefore, tbat petitioner sbould be discharged
from all custody and constraint, and be permitted to go
free wbile be remains under the protection of our laws.
POPULATION OF IOWA.—A table showing the number
of inhabitants of tbe several counties of the State, (taken
from the returns of tbe assessors,) has recently been pub-
lished, wbicb gives us 154,368 as tbe entire population of
the State. Tbe assessment, it is well known, was made
at an early period of tbe year, and tberefore does not in-
clude tbe unusually heavy immigration of last fall. It is
a safe calculation to say that under the federal census
wbicb is shortly to be taken, our population will exceed
200,000. As compared witb tbe return of 1847 tbe recent
return sbows an increase of 38,163. Our own county is
set down in this table at 11,649, against 10,071 two years
ago. Lee is set down at 16,000; Henry 7,329;, Jefferson
8,835; Louisa 4,155; Mahaska 5,559; Van Buren. 11,577;
Wapello 7,255; Polk 4,633; Davis 4,939; Washington 4,434.
JDes Moines Courier, Ottumiua, January 11, 1850.

